Rio’s ‘Internal Armed Conflict’ and Counter-Insurgency

Lucky you, you get to read my article for the Rio Times before it's published on Tuesday! Enjoy.

*

The end of 2010 was a busy time for Rio. Between Dilma’s election, the discovery of enormous pre-salt oil fields, and preparing for a massive Reveillon, one could almost forget Rio’s most important systemic concern. The favelas remain a central part of the city’s identity and a major source of many of its problems, and accordingly drew a good deal of attention from the U.S.’s Rio de Janeiro Consulate.

Late 2009 saw a flurry of activity in the favelas as the Favela Pacification Program and the UPP finished their first full active year with plans to expand (singling out Complexo de Alemao as the ‘epicenter of the fight’). However, foreshadowing the Navy APCs and marines in Zona Norte a few weeks ago and belying public confidence in the pacification efforts, retired Brazilian Army General Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro said in September 2009 that the Army was fully prepared to “occupy and maintain control of favelas,” given their experience in UN Peacekeeping operations around the world.

Acknowledging the lawlessness of the favelas, Pinherio said the Army is well suited for pacification, as “many officers and units were specifically trained and prepared to undertake operations related to public security and general policing in communities lacking state control.”

Wealth and poverty are not far apart here

It is significant in itself that a former high-ranking military official admits that the favelas, situated inside a megacity of one of the world’s strongest democracies, need a military occupation like those in Haiti or Sierra Leone. He is definitely not the only one to say so behind closed doors.

In November 2009 the Principal Officer of Rio’s U.S. Consulate met with an unnamed source in the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) in Rio. The source explained what he could not disclose publicly because of ‘Brazilian sensitivities;’ that the situation in the favelas as of November 2009 was “for all practical purposes, a full-blown ‘internal armed conflict,’” with all the implications that such a weighty characterization entails.

While not exactly the definition used in the Geneva Conventions, Protocol II, the main features of Rio’s violence closely resemble situations around the world widely recognized as ‘internal armed conflicts.’ These include “organized factions holding the monopoly on violence in their areas while in an open conflict with rival factions or/and state forces, the humanitarian impacts on innocent civilians trapped by violence in favelas dominated by gangs, and the need for ICRC to operate as though in a war zone.”

The Consulate tentatively agreed with the source’s assessment, noting that it describes Rio’s violence better than simple urban crime. To this extent it took special interest in the Favela Pacification Program’s ‘clear and hold’ approach, which “closely resembles U.S. counter-insurgency doctrine in Afghanistan and Iraq, and highlights the extent to which favelas have been outside state authority,” reads a diplomatic cable from November 2009.

Largely a problem Rio created for itself, the favelas present a unique environment of state failure within a successful state, more similar to Fallujah or Marjah than the Ipanema and Copacabana neighborhoods next door.

Rio State Secretary for Public Security Jose Beltrame explained to the U.S. Consulate, “you cannot imagine what government neglect of the favelas have done to this city. It is a failure of public service” that the city is now paying for with blood. Although the beginning phases of the Pacification Program have gone well, it is only the beginning of the fight.

"The cat." Electrical theft is rampant

As with U.S. counter-insurgency doctrine overseas, the ‘center of gravity’ in the favelas is the population. Success wholly depends on winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the residents, who must be made to trust and depend on the authorities, not an easy task for a government lacking legitimacy as a relative newcomer to the favelas. The crucial task is to deliver the services and benefits promised, which depends on civilian and NGO components of the Pacification Program following through after the UPPs.

Yet as of late 2009, during a visit to the pacified Dona Marta favela, U.S. representatives noted that “police officers are doing everything from assisting residents with requests for utilities to coaching sports. There is no cadre of civilian government and NGO personnel to handle those tasks, nor evidence of systematic programming for additional services.... If such a vacuum persists, it will wear down police capacity and lead to frustration among residents in pacified favelas, threatening the initial gains in those areas.”

The U.S. Consulate fully supported the Pacification Program and was enthusiastic about the results, saying they “could remake the social and economic fabric of Rio de Janeiro.” But however much U.S. support is genuinely humanitarian and good-hearted, there is no denying the enormous economic potential in the favelas.

According to José Luiz Alquéres, the president of Rio’s electric company Light, the economy of Rio de Janeiro could grow by 38 billion Reals (21 billion USD) through increased economic activity and new jobs, and 90 million Reals (45 million USD) in property and service taxes could be raised if the favelas were integrated into the rest of the city. Not a bad deal for the price tag – data from the Rio State Secretariat for Security show operations to pacify and reintegrate favelas would cost from 90 million to 340 million Reals (48 million to 183 million USD).

If Iraq is any example, we should realize that the road to favela pacification will be tough and bloody, but doable. What helped keep Iraq together was a history of strong central government and the promise of massive oil revenues. The favelas are a totally different situation, but if the authorities can coax the residents with commercial and educational opportunities, the hope of a better life, and then actually deliver that promise, perhaps Rio won't remain a city of millionaires surrounded by slums.

Happy New Year, btw.

Life and Violence

Ok so here we go, its been a busy week, Fluminense just won the Brazilian football championship, lots of things have happened and I'm behind on letting y'all know what's what. Let's crack a beer and get to work.

I've been teaching a couple of classes a week now, nothing serious, and I'm not sure the students like me. I talk too much and hate preparing lessons, especially since I'm paid very poorly. But now I started with a private student twice a week who pays three times more and likes to talk; he's a great, a contract lawyer at a downtown bank who's really, really into comics. Not just like "Oh I read graphic novels" or "I know all the names of Spiderman villains" but more like "I have 3,000 X-Men comics and 300 figurines I painted myself."

Lots of Brazilian nerds

Speaking of nerdiness, a few weeks ago I went to the Brazil Game Show, purportedly an exposition highlighting South American video game developers. It was actually completely dominated by Sony, hot dogs, and long lines. Overall it was underwhelming and crowded, and the convention girls were nothing special. They kinda looked depressed.

Kinda like Superman!

Then I went to the beach, swam in dangerous currents and got sunburned. Fortunately this gave me license to chill out only in my underwear at home, who readers who know me well will recognize as my favorite housewear. 

The next day I went up to the Sugarloaf, which is now what I call voluptuous girls as a term of endearment, and that was pretty neat as the first 'touristy' thing I had done really. The approach up the mountain is controlled by the military, and the previous week a gay man was shot by a soldier there (this was during the pride parade) for no reason. But then I saw some small monkeys ('Micu') and forgot about that.

The biggest news is all the violence and police/military operations that climaxed last week. As you probably have heard, the police invaded several slums in the north zone of Rio and will occupy them for some time. However this isn't really what affected or interested people here, and y'all didn't hear about it because of the latest bickering over in Korea.

It's kinda complicated, but partially the conflict is over the UPP, a 'peaceful police force' that was installed in several favelas around Rio. These new units are sent in to live with the locals, show the human and non-murderous side of the police to occupy and secure the slums after the murderous side has cleared out the bad guys. The governor started the UPP program to stop drug trafficking, but the dealers just decentralized and moved to other slums (the favelas are many and enormous. 1 out of 5 residents in the entire state of Rio live in a favela). Many of the gang leaders are in prison, but just give orders and command from there. When they heard that they were going to be transfered to federal prisons out of state, where life for them would suck a lot more and they would lose control of their gangs, they basically ordered their lackeys to start firebombing cars, attacking police posts and causing mayhem.

This is what started a two week orgy of violence and paranoia. Every day more and more reports of attacks on cars, busses and trucks came in, and people started staying in and not going to work. The metro was seen as safe so was crowded over capacity, which I remember sucking exquisitely. 

BOPE being badass

Most people said it was just a matter of time before this happened, as Rio's huge poverty and crime problems need to be tackled before the mega-events of the World Cup and Olympics. So for the next few days there were tons of cops everywhere, helicopters flying low, and other shows of force; down where I and most gringos and rich people live, there wasn't much except a few shootings and arrastaos. But in the north zone the BOPE, police and marines supported by APCs quickly expelled the gangs from several key neighborhoods. Some BOPE members even complained that the dealers weren't putting up enough of a fight.

Obviously a lot of bad guys got away, and they left lots of drugs (3 tons of marijuana and 300 kilos of coke) and guns behind. So where did they go? Probably to Rochina, one of Rio's largest and most famous slums, inconveniently located very close to Leblon and Ipanema, the richest neighborhoods. (Check out this video I took of a bomb scare in Ipanema.) At this point the gangsters are squeezed and trapped, and could get more dangerous. The two main factions, the Red Command and Amigos dos Amigos, are rumored to have formed an alliance against the cops (with whom they themselves had a treaty of sorts with). NEM, the supposed leader of Amigos dos Amigos that rules Rochina, controls the distribution of cooking gas there and buys silence by being a community benefactor and sponsor for the residents. He was involved in a nasty shootout in the Intercontinental Hotel a few months ago that highlighted how the gangs often paid off the police, how some BOPE members might be involved with the Amigos, and how a whole different problem of 'milicias' of ex-cops run extortion rings and protection rackets.

Just this is a tiny fraction of what's happening, it's all pretty confusing, and only the beginning. What is clear is that the government is cracking down hard, and enjoys huge popular support. Police and military convoys get cheered in the streets, not something you would expect from a county with a history of military dictatorship. The people are tired of the gangs and crime and trafficking, and do not mind when innocents die by police bullets. Some think the favelas should just be razed. This raises the very important issue of potential "fascism against the poor," as a friend of mine put it. BOPE shoot first and ask questions later; the people and politicians look the other way because they just want something done.