Rio’s ‘Internal Armed Conflict’ and Counter-Insurgency

Lucky you, you get to read my article for the Rio Times before it's published on Tuesday! Enjoy.

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The end of 2010 was a busy time for Rio. Between Dilma’s election, the discovery of enormous pre-salt oil fields, and preparing for a massive Reveillon, one could almost forget Rio’s most important systemic concern. The favelas remain a central part of the city’s identity and a major source of many of its problems, and accordingly drew a good deal of attention from the U.S.’s Rio de Janeiro Consulate.

Late 2009 saw a flurry of activity in the favelas as the Favela Pacification Program and the UPP finished their first full active year with plans to expand (singling out Complexo de Alemao as the ‘epicenter of the fight’). However, foreshadowing the Navy APCs and marines in Zona Norte a few weeks ago and belying public confidence in the pacification efforts, retired Brazilian Army General Alvaro de Souza Pinheiro said in September 2009 that the Army was fully prepared to “occupy and maintain control of favelas,” given their experience in UN Peacekeeping operations around the world.

Acknowledging the lawlessness of the favelas, Pinherio said the Army is well suited for pacification, as “many officers and units were specifically trained and prepared to undertake operations related to public security and general policing in communities lacking state control.”

Wealth and poverty are not far apart here

It is significant in itself that a former high-ranking military official admits that the favelas, situated inside a megacity of one of the world’s strongest democracies, need a military occupation like those in Haiti or Sierra Leone. He is definitely not the only one to say so behind closed doors.

In November 2009 the Principal Officer of Rio’s U.S. Consulate met with an unnamed source in the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC) in Rio. The source explained what he could not disclose publicly because of ‘Brazilian sensitivities;’ that the situation in the favelas as of November 2009 was “for all practical purposes, a full-blown ‘internal armed conflict,’” with all the implications that such a weighty characterization entails.

While not exactly the definition used in the Geneva Conventions, Protocol II, the main features of Rio’s violence closely resemble situations around the world widely recognized as ‘internal armed conflicts.’ These include “organized factions holding the monopoly on violence in their areas while in an open conflict with rival factions or/and state forces, the humanitarian impacts on innocent civilians trapped by violence in favelas dominated by gangs, and the need for ICRC to operate as though in a war zone.”

The Consulate tentatively agreed with the source’s assessment, noting that it describes Rio’s violence better than simple urban crime. To this extent it took special interest in the Favela Pacification Program’s ‘clear and hold’ approach, which “closely resembles U.S. counter-insurgency doctrine in Afghanistan and Iraq, and highlights the extent to which favelas have been outside state authority,” reads a diplomatic cable from November 2009.

Largely a problem Rio created for itself, the favelas present a unique environment of state failure within a successful state, more similar to Fallujah or Marjah than the Ipanema and Copacabana neighborhoods next door.

Rio State Secretary for Public Security Jose Beltrame explained to the U.S. Consulate, “you cannot imagine what government neglect of the favelas have done to this city. It is a failure of public service” that the city is now paying for with blood. Although the beginning phases of the Pacification Program have gone well, it is only the beginning of the fight.

"The cat." Electrical theft is rampant

As with U.S. counter-insurgency doctrine overseas, the ‘center of gravity’ in the favelas is the population. Success wholly depends on winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the residents, who must be made to trust and depend on the authorities, not an easy task for a government lacking legitimacy as a relative newcomer to the favelas. The crucial task is to deliver the services and benefits promised, which depends on civilian and NGO components of the Pacification Program following through after the UPPs.

Yet as of late 2009, during a visit to the pacified Dona Marta favela, U.S. representatives noted that “police officers are doing everything from assisting residents with requests for utilities to coaching sports. There is no cadre of civilian government and NGO personnel to handle those tasks, nor evidence of systematic programming for additional services.... If such a vacuum persists, it will wear down police capacity and lead to frustration among residents in pacified favelas, threatening the initial gains in those areas.”

The U.S. Consulate fully supported the Pacification Program and was enthusiastic about the results, saying they “could remake the social and economic fabric of Rio de Janeiro.” But however much U.S. support is genuinely humanitarian and good-hearted, there is no denying the enormous economic potential in the favelas.

According to José Luiz Alquéres, the president of Rio’s electric company Light, the economy of Rio de Janeiro could grow by 38 billion Reals (21 billion USD) through increased economic activity and new jobs, and 90 million Reals (45 million USD) in property and service taxes could be raised if the favelas were integrated into the rest of the city. Not a bad deal for the price tag – data from the Rio State Secretariat for Security show operations to pacify and reintegrate favelas would cost from 90 million to 340 million Reals (48 million to 183 million USD).

If Iraq is any example, we should realize that the road to favela pacification will be tough and bloody, but doable. What helped keep Iraq together was a history of strong central government and the promise of massive oil revenues. The favelas are a totally different situation, but if the authorities can coax the residents with commercial and educational opportunities, the hope of a better life, and then actually deliver that promise, perhaps Rio won't remain a city of millionaires surrounded by slums.

Happy New Year, btw.